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I.INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint submission to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”), to
establish outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.1 China
immediately objected to the submission, and sent a note verbale to the
United Nations General Secretary to be delivered to the UN member
States.2 In its note verbale, China alleged that the insular features and
maritime areas within the nine-dash line belonged to China and added
“it has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea
and the adjacent waters.”3 China said it enjoys “sovereign rights and
jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil
thereof.”4 The language used by China in the note verbale was ambiguous
and did not indicate what kind of maritime jurisdiction China was
claiming. There was also ambiguity in China’s position regarding the
status of the insular features in the South China Sea (“SCS”) whether
they are low tide elevations, rocks or islands. In another note verbale,
China claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and added they
were islands under Article 121 of UNCLOS, therefore they were

“Receipt of the joint submission made by Malaysia and the Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,”
CLCS.33.2009.LOS (Continental Shelf Notification) (7 May 2009). Article 4 of the
Annex II of the Law of the Sea Convention provides:
Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer
limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars
of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical
data as soon as possible; but in any case, within 10 years of the entry into force of
this Convention for that State. The coastal State shall at the same time give the
names of any Commission members who have provided it with scientific and
technical advice.
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted December 10, 1982, 1883 UNTS
396,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_con
vention.htm [hereinafter “LOSC”].
2 People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/17/2009 of May 7,
2009.
3 Id.
4 Id. (China reiterated its position in the note verbal of 14 April 2011).
1
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entitled to territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf.5

2009

Map 1. The nine-dash line map which China attached its note verbal in

The nine–dash line if connected would cover ninety percent of the SCS.
Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes
Involving China: Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 21 (Dec.
22, 2015); see People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale CML/8/2011 (April 14,
2011).
5
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Assuming China owns all of the insular features in the SCS,
this paper evaluates the China’s nine-dash line claim under
international law in light of the ruling by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration over the dispute between the Philippines and China
(“South China Sea Arbitration”),6 and evaluates the effect of the ruling
on the delimitation of the maritime areas in the SCS. The ruling by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration about the SCS is the first decision by
an international tribunal attempting to clarify the difference between
islands, rocks and low tide elevations.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE CLAIMS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF
‘HISTORIC TITLE’ THEORY
Some scholars argue that the Chinese claims can be justified in
the perspective of “historic title” theory.7 Gao argues that “support for
this view may be found in the resolution adopted at the 1947 interministry meeting; the expression “limits of territory in the South China
Sea” was employed in the resolution,” and that “the precise meaning
of the reference in Chinese Note I [note verbale of 2009]8 to “adjacent
waters” over which it has sovereignty (…) has never been defined by
China.”9
The Arbitration Tribunal in Government of the State of Eritrea and
Government of the Republic of Yemen has made an important distinction
between the doctrine of “historic title” and “historical consolidation.”
It goes as follows:
The notion of historic title is well known in
international law, not least in respect of ‘historic bays’,
which are governed by rules exceptional to the normal
rules about bays. Historic bays again rely upon a kind
of “ancient title”: a title that has so long been
6 The South China Sea Arbitration, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION
(July 12, 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PHCN-20160712-Award.pdf.
7 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea:
History, Status, and Implications, 107 Am. J. of Int’l. L. 98, 109 (Jan. 2013).
8 Note Verbale CML/17/2009, supra note 2.
9 Id.
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established by common repute that this common
knowledge is itself a sufficient title. But an historic title
has also another and different meaning in international
law as a title that has been created, or consolidated, by
a process of prescription, or acquiescence, or by
possession so long continued to have become accepted
as law as a title. These titles too are historic in the sense
that continuity and the lapse of a period of time is of
the essence.10
This implies that 1) historic title is based on “common repute”
that has been established since time immemorial, meaning that
whoever inquires the existence of historic title will focus on historical
documents documenting the perception of States and individuals in
different historical times, and will be less focused on material evidence
of effective control. 2) Whereas in historical consolidation a
combination of modern titles, such as prescription and occupation,
that has existed over long periods of time will be the determinant in a
State’s land claim. So the doctrine of historical consolidation is more
related to modern territorial titles recognized in international law today;
this is probably why the International Court of Justice, in its Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria decision, noted that “The
Court notes that the theory of historical consolidation is highly
controversial and cannot replace the existing modes of acquisition of
title in international law.”11 Brownlie refers to historical consolidation
as being “not much more than a compendium of pre-existing modes
of acquisition”, and says that “the accepted view is that consolidation
does not exist as a concept independent of the established rules
governing effective occupation and prescription.”12

10 Eritrea v. Yemen, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute, Reports
of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XXII pp. 209-332, para. 106 (Oct. 9, 1998).
11 Land and Maritime Boundry between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nigeria: Equitorial Guinea Intervening), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Reports 303, para. 103
(Oct. 10, 2002).
12 JAMES
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (8th ed., Oxford University Press, 2012); See also
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 520 (6th ed., Cambridge University Press,
2008).
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A. Historic Title: Common Repute
A state’s claim to historic title, otherwise called “original title”13
or “ancient title,”14 as mentioned above, depends upon whether that
State can establish that there was a common perception since time
immemorial that a certain area of territory or water were within their
possession. Examining a series of arbitral and judicial decisions on this
issue reveals that courts take the following factors into account when
examining whether a state’s claim to historic title is valid:
1.

Whether the Parties Involved had a Common Perception of the
Island’s Existence

The International Court of Justice (“IC”) in its Sovereignty Over
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge case
examined whether the islands under dispute between Malaysia and
Singapore were terra incognita in the colonial periods when Britain and
the Sultan of Johor were in existence as predecessor states to the
disputing parties.15 This is important because in order to have a
common perception that a certain piece of land or maritime territory
belongs to some party, that piece itself has to be at least recognized as
existing to all parties involved.
2.

The Territorial Regime of the Region and Time

In the Eritrea v. Yemen case, the arbitral court noted that the
“concept of territorial sovereignty was entirely strange to an entity such
as medieval Yemen,” and henceforth dismissed the Yemeni claims that
it had “ancient title” over the disputed islands.16 This implies that in
order for a State to claim ancient title over a land or maritime territory,
the parties involved must share, at the very least, a common perception

Id.
Id.
15 Sovereignty Over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment, 2008 ICJ Reports, 27 (May 23, 2008), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf.
16 Supra note 11, at 248.
13
14
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that a state have also been used by other States, whether there was
something similar to a condominium arrangement or not.17
3.

The Existence of Rival Claims

In the Pedra Branca case, the ICJ took into account that there
was no challenge to the Sultanate of Johor’s claim to the island, citing
the lack of Norwegian claim to the lands in Eastern Greenland in the
Permanent Court of International Justice’s infamous Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland case.18
B. Historical Consolidation
We have established above19 that historical consolidation is a
mixture of pre-existing modes of territorial acquisition, namely
prescription and occupation. The question to be raised here is could
maritime territory be acquired in the same way as land territory? And,
this question arises due to the following reason: In land territory, it is
established that any piece of land that is not terra nullius belongs to a
particular State, and that even terra nullius can be occupied by a State if
that State fulfills all requirements of occupation prescribed in
international law.20 The concept of “res communis” or the modern
“common heritage or mankind” has little place in land-territorial
regimes, unless some States establish condominium agreements or
other sui generis regimes in some of their territories.21
However, when it comes to maritime territory, or internal
waters or territorial sea in terms of modern international law of the sea,
there was always a conflict between the doctrine of open seas, known
as the doctrine of mare liberum, which dictates that maritime areas be
Andrea Gioia, Historic Titles, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 13 (Oxford University Press, 2013); D.P.
O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA: VOLUME 1 423(Oxford
University Press, 1982).
18 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53, 27 (Apr. 5, 1933).
19 See p. 5.
20 Malcolm Shaw, supra note 12, at 503.
21 Lea Brilmeyer and Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in
Search of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 703, 704 (2001).
17
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open to all States for navigation and economic activities, and that of
mare clausum, which argued for occupation of the seas by certain States.
Dutch jurist Huig de Groot (known in common literature as Hugo
Grotius) argued in his infamous booklet, Mare Liberum, that the sea
must be free and not susceptible to occupation.22 Grotius, on the
premise that only what is subject to occupation be subject to
possession, made the aforementioned distinction between the land and
the sea, saying that the limitlessness of the latter,23 as well as the fact
that the sea belongs to “all things which can be used without loss to
anyone else.”24 In contrast, John Selden published in 1635 a treatise
named Mare Clausum, the main argument of which is that the
territorial sea is indeed subject to occupation by a State.25
The Grotian conception of the open seas was accepted in
international law by the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 19th century
Huebner tried to justify maritime blockades by championing a
“territorial-occupation theory of blockade” Neff explains it to mean
that “a blockading squadron occupies the portion of the sea which is
enclosed within the line of the ships and consequently that a blockade
involves a ‘substitution of sovereignty’ over the enveloped sea area.”26
This notion, that enclosure might actually mean occupation of a certain
patch of ocean water, is heavily criticized by British and American
commentators such as Hall.27 The consensus was actually possible due
to the proposal of Cornelius van Bynkershoeck- in his book, De
Dominio Maris Disseratatio, he based his argument on the premise
that ‘no sea was (currently) possessed by anyone, and went on to
suggest that “the control of the land extends as far as cannon will
carry.” Bynkershoeck’s proposal was accepted in State practice as the
so-called “three-mile rule,”28 which Great Britain, the United States,
RALPH VAN DEMIAN MCGOFFIN, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS: A
DISSERTATION BY HUGO GROTIUS 32 (1916).
23 Id. at 34.
24 Id. at 27.
25 John Selden, MARE CLAUSUM: THE RIGHT AND DOMINION OF THE
SEA IN TWO BOOKS 72 (London, 1663).
26 STEVEN J. NEFF, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS: A
GENERAL HISTORY 92 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
27 Id. at 93.
28 “The old rule of the cannon-shot, crystallized into the present three
marine miles measured from low water mark, may be modified at a later period
inasmuch as certain nations claim wider jurisdiction […]. There is an obvious
22
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and France accepted.29 The Grotian concept still lives on in the
modern law of the sea, subject to a few tweaks, such as the
introduction of the “twelve-nautical-mile rule” and the introduction of
the sovereign rights concept on the resources of the exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf, which is a limitation of the
States’ high-sea rights but actually conforms to the Grotian notion of
the separability of dominium and imperium.30 Also, the sovereign rights of
States do not rely on occupation; they rely on rights ab initio and the
proclamations of States, as established by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).
An overview of this history on the of the seas reveals that (i)
the seas are, not in principle, subject to any forms of occupation; (ii)
whatever sovereignty enjoyed by states due to the seas derives from the
concept of “the land dominates the sea” – in other words, it is the
occupying of land, and the resulting need to assume control of some of
the waters around it, that is the basis of sovereignty over the waters.
Occupation of the waters themselves does not ensure sovereignty over
the waters.31 Historical consolidation, as well as its subcomponents,
cannot serve as the territorial title for oceans. This notion also applied
to China when it was incorporated into the international legal order in
the mid-19th century.
C. Customary International Law
Even though occupation or prescription cannot themselves
serve as territorial title over the oceanic waters, there remains the
reason for that. The marginal strip of territorial waters based originally on the
cannon-shot, was founded on the necessity of the riparian State to protect itself
from outward attack, by providing something in the nature of an insulating zone,
which very reasonably should be extended with the accrued possibility of offense
due to the wider range of modern ordnance.” North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case
(Great Britain, United States), Arbitral Award of Sept. 7, 1910, Reports of
International Arbitral Awards (RIAA) XI, 167, 205.
29 ROTHWELL ET AL., OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE S EA 26
(Oxford University Press, 2015).
30 Id.
31 Lea Brilmeyer and Natalie Klein, supra note 21, at 707; ee Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp.
No. 9, art. 68, Commentary, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
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possibility that even without the existence of historic rights recognized
by the relevant parties since the beginning of their respective nations,
the relatively recent sovereign claim over the seas, accompanied by
explicit or implicit acceptance by the relevant States, can alter the
existing territorial sea regime and allow for additional patches of ocean
water to fall under the sovereignty of a State. This possibility was
recognized in the ICJ’s Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case in 1951, in which
Norway’s argument that its straight-baseline system was acquiesced by
the government of Britain and accepted by the Courts of other States.32
Shaw has confirmed that this case is irrelevant to the doctrine of
historical consolidation.33
Since this way of assuming sovereign control over a patch of
water depends on the implicit consent or acquiescence of other States,
the Claimant State’s claims must satisfy a number of criteria to ensure
that the other States can genuinely consent to that State’s claim.
Before jumping into the contents of each criterion one has to
recognize the unique nature of acquiescence in modern law of the sea.
On land, acquiescence or explicit acceptance is usually done by the
state with competing claims to the particular piece of land in question;
this means that the legal relationships arising under acquiescence tend
to be bilateral. However, when it comes to expanding the internal
waters or territorial sea, the relationship is rarely bilateral; all nations
have an interest in the freedom of the high seas.34 This means that the
law of the sea is more general in nature than the system of land
boundaries – which implies that changing this regime is akin to
changing general rules of customary international law. So the scope of
acceptance for a sui generis regime when it comes to internal waters or
territorial sea has to be extensive and substantially uniform35 – if one is
to borrow from the terminology used in the North Sea Continental Shelf
case.
The three commonly recognized criteria for acquiescence to
the State’s historic waters claim is stated as follows: (i) the claim has to
be formally made by the appropriate governmental authorities and
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951 ICJ Reports 137 (1951).
Shaw, supra note 12, at 507.
34 CLIVE R. SYMMONS, HISTORIC WATERS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: A
MODERN RE-APPRAISAL 55 (2008).
35 Id. at 57.
32
33
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must be clear and consistent,36 (ii) the claim has to be made public to
other states,37 (iii) the claim has to be continued long enough for other
states to make implicit acceptance of that claim.38 The first requirement
is in place because no state can make implicit acceptance of another
state’s territorial claim if the original State never made an official claim
to the international community. The United Nations study on the
juridical regime of historic bays says that the declarations “must
emanate from the State or its organs;”39 and I) the claim must come
from the authorities competent to state the official positions of that
government, preferably the executive branch,40 II) The official claim
must be clear in its content- “the coastal State must leave no doubt
about its intention to claim the water area as part of its national
territory,”41 III) The claim must be consistent- the ICJ based its
decision on the El Salvador/Honduras case on the “consistent claims
of the three States.”42
Second, the claim must show sufficient “notoriety.” If the
claim is not made public, the other states, with a certain interest in the
freedom of the seas in that area, would miss the chance to be aware of
the other State’s claim. This means that the fellow States would not
develop the will to implicitly accept that other State’s claim. Therefore,
I) a claim has to be made public enough for States to make effective
protests; claimed buried in domestic documents or voluminous
pleadings is not sufficient to make a claim “public”43; II) the claim may
be made in bilateral notifications to other states, or by unilateral declarations;44
III) Open exercise of jurisdiction might suffice, given that other states have
other ways to be aware of the legal nature of that claim.
Third, the claim must have continued for a certain period of
time long enough for acquiescence to occur. “Mere sporadic

Supra note 34, at 117.
Id. at 141.
38 Id. at 151.
39 United Nations, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143, 14 (1962)
40 Supra note 34, at 121.
41 Id. at 128.
42 El Salvador/Honduras, 1992 ICJ Reports 601.
43 Supra note 34, at 140.
44 Id. at 144.
36
37
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enforcement of sovereign rights in allegedly historic waters will not
suffice.”45 The exact extent of the time requirement is not clear,
although, as the United Nations Juridical Regime study confirms, the
extent is closely related to the “extent that an inference of acquiescence
may be drawn from it.” If international reaction to the historic claim is
strongly pointing toward implicit acceptance of that claim, then only a
relatively short passage of time might be required. The ICJ accepted
this interrelationship between the passage of time requirement and the
acceptance of states requirement when it confirmed in the seminal
North Sea Continental Shelf case that a norm of customary
international law might be formed in a relatively short period of time if
the States with an interest in that particular norm made an “extensive
and virtually uniform” acceptance of that norm.46
The logical questions that follow entail (i) the extent of
knowledge that the States must have in acquiescing to the historic
waters claim, and (ii) the number of the States that must be involved in
the acquiescence. The accepted premise is that full knowledge of the
claim’s ‘nature’ and ‘geographical extent’ must be known by the states
making implicit acceptance. Libya argued during its Tunisia/Libya case
before the ICJ that Tunisian actions on its claimed historic waters
reflect[ed] substantial variations and fluctuations in the size of the
territorial sea, methods of establishing baselines, and designations of a
reserved and contiguous fishing zones47 and therefore argued there
could not be acquiescence on the part of Libya. As Regarding the
requirement on the extent of the participation, since the historic waters
claim entails an encroachment of the high seas and therefore means a
limitation of fishing and navigation rights within that area, the states
with a navigational or fishing interest in the area claimed as historic
waters by another state must, at minimum, participate in the implicit
acceptance.

45
46
47

Id. at 152.
North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 ICJ Reports 38.
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J.

Reports 45.
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D. The Relationship Between the Historic Waters Regime and
UNCLOS
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) makes only few statements on historic waters – Article
10(6) of UNCLOS refers to historic bays, and Article 15 refers to
historic title as constituting one of the “special circumstances” that
allow states to derogate from the “equidistance” or “median” rule in
territorial sea delimitation. In other rules regarding the territorial sea,
UNCLOS sets quite clear and uniform rules on the extent of the
territorial sea that coastal states may enjoy, meaning that exceptions to
such uniform rules should be limited to those explicitly accepted in
UNCLOS. Failure to limit such exceptions would result in
unacceptable variations of claims in regard to baselines, which would
mean a loss of limits on the states’ claims to its Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf areas, leading to uneven
encroachment of the res communis principle. So this means that the
historic waters regime would only have meaning in UNCLOS regimes
with regard to (i) “historic bays” and (ii) territorial sea delimitation.
Even though Article 15 allows States to account for historic
rights or waters in territorial sea delimitation, this provision actually
limits the scope in which historical waters claims might be articulated.
The premise of Article 15 is that states have overlapping claims in
regard to its territorial sea, even when said claims are limited by Article
3 of UNCLOS, which limits its scope to 12 nautical miles from its
baselines. So Article 15 would not apply when the length of maritime
areas between states extends beyond 24 nautical miles between their
respective baselines. A State might argue that their historic waters
constitute internal waters, a scheme accepted by the ICJ in its Fisheries
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) case (which would mean that
its historic waters would be actually “within” the baselines of that
State). Even so, Articles 5 and 7 of UNCLOS explicitly limit the ways
in which baselines are drawn with Article 7 accepting the formula
developed by the ICJ in its Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v.
Norway). So any historic “internal waters” claim that does not fit with
the baselines regime developed by UNCLOS would be incompatible
with the UNCLOS regime. These two limitations seriously limit the
scope in which historic waters claims could be made in regard to
internal waters or territorial sea. Even if one could pass through these
438
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limitations, the historic waters claim would only serve as “special
circumstances” in delimiting the territorial sea in which overlapping
claims exist, meaning that such claims are subject to negotiations
between two countries or judicial review based on equity.
One could argue that since Article 10(6) allows states to
derogate from the definition of juridical bays, as defined in Article
10(2),48 might fall into the scope of bays and thus be included in the list
of historical waters regimes that UNCLOS explicitly proposes. Even
though this might be true, especially with bays that do not have lowwater marks of the natural entrance points that are more than 24
nautical miles apart, it would be satisfactory for our discussion here to
point out that the most traditional definitions of bays was based on the
so-called headland theory.49 This theory requires bays to be enclosed
“by reference to straight lines linking the headlands wherever the
geographical situation really withdrew the waters within them for the
traffic of nations.”50 This is in line with the Grotian argument that
enclosed features of the sea are exceptionally subject to occupation
and, therefore, imperium by individual States.51 This means that
maritime features not encompassed by straight lines between
headlands cannot be regarded as bays, even in terms of Article 10(6) of
UNCLOS.
A further argument is that the UNCLOS regime co-exists with
the customary law regime regarding baselines and the territorial sea,
which means that historic title may coexist with normal or straight
baselines drawn up by UNCLOS. If this argument is to be valid, there
has to be no legal conflict between the historical waters regime put
forward by China and the regime for internal waters and territorial sea.
However, such a proposition suffers from the fact that if the territorial
sea boundaries of supposed historic waters exceed that of the 12-mile
48 “For the purposes of this Convention, a bay is a well-marked
indentation whose penetration is of such proportion to the width of its mouth as to
contain land-locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast.
An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as,
or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the
mouth of that indentation.”
49 Supra note 17, at 380.
50 Id. at 382.
51 Supra note 22.
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limit set from the normal or straight baselines drawn up by UNCLOS,
it conflicts with Article 3 of UNCLOS which has a clear intent of
forbidding that exact phenomenon. This can be seen as a conflict
between customary international law and new treaty law, in which the
principle lex posterior derogate legi priori would apply. One might argue
that the lex specialis principle would apply and so the special regime of
historic waters might prevail over the general regime defined by
UNCLOS, but UNCLOS, as stated above, is clearly intent on limiting
the scope of historical regimes that could be used to derogate from its
rules. Thus, rules that contradict this limitation of scope cannot be
considered lex specialis rules that can derogate from UNCLOS.
Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Article 311(2) of
UNCLOS stipulates “this Convention shall not alter the rights and
obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements
compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the
enjoyment by other States parties of their rights and the performance
of their obligations under this Convention.” As the Philippines v. China
arbitral tribunal accurately pointed out, the logical corollary of this
provision is that if the rights and obligations of a particular State Party
are “incompatible with the Convention” or “affects the enjoyment by
other States parties of their rights and the performance of their
obligations,” those rights and obligations are altered by the provisions
of UNCLOS.52
E. An Analysis of the Chinese Claim
The arbitral tribunal in the Philippines v. China case did not rule
on the possibility that China might be claiming the waters within the
nine-dash line as part of their historical waters because China declared
an optional exception according to Article 298(1)(a)(i) of UNCLOS on
disputes regarding “historical bays or titles.”53 The tribunal moved on
to establish its jurisdiction (by virtue of its competence de a
competence (French) or Kompetenz-Kompetenz (German) on this
case by declaring that China’s claims are actually claims concerning
historical rights, not historic title or historic waters.54 In examining the
52
53
54

South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 252.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 31.
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validity of China’s potential historic waters claims, therefore, it is not
necessary to make an examination of the specific findings of the
arbitral tribunal. However, some of the points made by the tribunal,
such as the tribunal’s findings on whether China’s claims satisfied the
criteria for acquiescence is worth a glance.
1.

Does China Have Historic Title Over the Waters Within the
Nine-dash Line?

China has never clearly explained the legal nature it holds on
the islands or waters within the nine-dash line. Even though its
reference to historic rights in its notes verbales simply that China is
indeed making a historic waters or rights claim over the waters within
that line, China, perhaps in an attempt to keep strategic ambiguity,
never made clear whether it was claiming “historic rights” in the
meaning similar to “sovereign rights” recognized under UNCLOS on
its EEZ regime, or referring to the “historic waters” regime of internal
waters or territorial sea. As a corollary, China has never officially
presented evidence that backs up its claims for historic title over the
waters within the nine-dash line.
Even though official presentations by the government of
relevant evidence is scarce, a number of Chinese scholars have tried to
back up its claims by presenting historical evidence that the waters in
the SCS were perceived as Chinese waters since time immemorial.
These scholars cite (i) records on fishing; (ii) records on sporadic
military expeditions, particularly the one conducted by Zheng He
during the Ming era; (iii) records on naming; and (iv) records on
administrative boundaries.55 The main weakness in the Chinese
scholars’ works is that they are only focused on records kept by the
Chinese imperial government; it does not show enough records from
neighboring countries, or countries that shared the maritime routes at
time, to show that there was a “common perception” among China
and other countries that the waters in question belonged to China.
Indeed, records on expeditions show that these expeditions
were rather sporadic, and China did not amass a stationary army to
Jianming Shen, China’s Sovereignty Over the South China Sea Islands: A
Historical Perspective, 1 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 103, 107 (2002).
55
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solidify their new occupation; rather, the expeditions often resulted in a
tributary relationship between the Chinese imperial house and the local
residents residing in the islands in question. Zhang He’s expeditionary
fleet carried presents that were presented to the so-called “nomads,” a
tradition which was a distinctive feature of the Chinese tributary
system in which the “Son of the Skies,” the Chinese emperor,
presented gifts to its underlying nomads in order to spread the culture
of Chinese civilization to the so-called “uncivilized” areas.56 Also,
Zhang He’s expeditions did not result in continuous military rule over
the areas he covered; maritime expeditions were suspended shortly
after the expeditions, allowing new influential civilizations to grow on
the outer areas.57
2.

The Problem of Acquiescence

The other way China can justify its historic waters claims over
the waters within the nine-dash line is to claim that other States
surrounding the area have acquiesced its claims. This differs from the
historic waters claim that mainly relies on recent evidence of implicit
acceptance, opposed to the ancient evidence of common perception
that traditional historic waters claims rely upon, which accompany the
relatively recently formulated claim that the waters are historically part
of that State’s sovereignty.
Taking into account the above-mentioned criteria, there are a
few problems that significantly undermine the persuasiveness of the
possible Chinese claim of acquiescence. First, the Chinese claim of
historic waters has not been geographically consistent, nor has it clearly
identified the legal nature of its claim. The Atlas of the Administrative
Areas of China, published by the Kuomintang government in 1948 refers
to an “eleven-dash line,”58 which differs from the “nine-dash line”
published in Notes Verbales to Vietnam and the Philippines in 2009.59
56 JOO KYUNG-CHUL, THE AGE OF MARITIME EXPANSION 13 (Seoul
National University Press, 2002).
57 Id. at 17.
58 United States State Department, Limits in the Seas: No. 143, Maritime
Claims in the South China Sea, 3 (Dec. 5, 2014), available at
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf.
59 Id.
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These are the only two times in which China has officially identified
the geographical scope of its claims, and they do not match each other
geographically. The very notion that a series of dashes, and not a
straight line, can mark a maritime territorial boundary seems odd and
causes geographical ambiguity.
Even if one accepts that China was actually consistent
geographically when making aforementioned claims, one needs to note
that China has never made clear the legal basis on which it placed its
claims. China, in its Notes Verbales to Vietnam and the Philippines
claimed that waters within the nine-dash line are within its
“sovereignty,” but it is not clear whether this means that the waters
within the nine-dash line are China’s internal waters or territorial sea.
Indeed, some Chinese scholars acknowledge that the Chinese claims
can be interpreted as a case for historic “fisheries rights,”60 not historic
waters; which means that the notion of “sovereignty” in the Chinese
documents can actually be interpreted to mean “sovereign rights,”
which is based on the Grotian separation of dominium and imperium.
Unless China makes its legal basis clear, it is difficult for other States to
provide effective acquiescence to its claims.61
Second, the time in which China has placed its historic claims
is insufficient for other States to make effective acquiescence. As
mentioned above, only in 2009 did China clarify that its claims on the
waters within the nine-dash line is subject to its “sovereignty”(subject
to more ambiguity).
Third, there were actually serious protests by other States after
the 2009 claim. Here, one has to note the previous discussion that
acquiescence of maritime claims is different from the acquiescence of
land claims because, unlike land claims, the interests involved are
barely bilateral and many states share a common interest in maintaining
freedom of navigation and overflight in the particular sea area. This is
especially true in the case of the SCS, given its large proportion of
global shipping that passes through this area and proximity to the
Malacca Strait. This means that the position of global shipping power
States, such as the United States, is of significance; the US, however, in
Zou Keyuan and Liu Zinchang, The Legal Status of the U-Shaped Line in
the South China Sea, 14 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 57, 63 (2015).
61 Supra note 58, at 22.
60
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its Limits in the Seas report, made clear that if the Chinese claims are
based on the notion of acquiescence, then China does not have a legal
basis to support its claim.62
3.

UNCLOS

Even if the Chinese claim of historic waters can be justified by
the traditional rules of acquiescence and historic title, it is reasonable to
interpret this regime to have been overridden by the UNCLOS regime.
First, the nine-dash line is not encompassed by headlands that mark
the lands surrounding it, which means that the area is not an example
of a “bay” in customary international law. This strips the area of the
eligibility to be qualified as a “historic bay” in the meaning of Article
10(5) of UNCLOS. Second, the historic waters claim that the ninedash line represents stretches far beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea
zone that can be drawn up from its baselines, even if one assumes that
all the islands and rocks within the nine-dash line belong to China and
that the low-tide elevations that China claims to be “islands” are
actually islands in the meaning of Article 121(1) of UNCLOS. This
means that the overlapping sovereignty claims between China,
Philippines and Vietnam are not overlapping twelve-mile claims
envisioned by Article 15 of UNCLOS, which means that the “historic
circumstances” cannot serve as “special circumstances” in territorial
sea delimitation between these countries.
Article 311(2), explained above, reinforces this conclusion. The
historic waters claims of China, for reasons explained above, is indeed
incompatible with the territorial sea regime put forward by UNCLOS,
and seriously affects the navigational rights of States within the area.

62

Id.
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE CLAIMS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF
‘HISTORICAL RIGHTS’ THEORY
A. Legal Basis for Historical “Sovereign Rights”
Claims to historical sovereign rights means “a State is claiming
to exercise certain rights, usually fishing rights, in what is usually
deemed to be international waters.”63 This means that the State is not
claiming exclusive sovereignty over the disputed waters, but arguing
for historical rights over the resources of those waters. This lack of
exclusivity in their claims makes historical rights claims different from
those of the historical waters claims. As a logical corollary, this leads to
two further differences: (i) the lack of exclusivity means that several
“historical sovereign rights” can exist within the same body of water;
(ii) claims to historic rights tend to be specific in its scope, such as
specific rights to fish specific species or catch specific resources.
Despite the differences, any historical rights claims put forward
by a State, just like historic waters claims, must be supported by
customary international law. With both types of claims, the consent of
the interested parties is rarely given explicitly through the form of a
treaty. Even if relevant treaties are concluded, the treaties usually only
mean a post facto acceptance of the historical right already established
such as the boundary agreement between Australia and Papua New
Guinea.64 Therefore, the practice of the Claimant State must be
supported by non-action or acceptance of the parties involved,
followed by opinion juris of the involved parties. This consideration
makes the criteria for acquiescence important for recognition of
historic rights as well, which means the Claimant State must establish
the criteria of acquiescence.

Leonardo Bernard, The Effect of Historic Fishing Rights in Maritime
Boundaries Delimitation, in Securing the Ocean for the Next Generation, LOSI Conference
Papers, 2012.
64 Id. at 9.
63
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B. The Relationship Between UNCLOS and the Historical
“Sovereign Rights” Claim
Even if a States’ historical rights claims are established by
international law, the question still arises as to whether the impending
imposition of UNCLOS, and the resultant activation of the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf regimes, actually
nullifies States’ title to aforementioned historical rights. This question
relates to the topic of legal conflicts between the EEZ or Continental
Shelf regimes, and States’ historical rights Claims. If there is no
conflict, Article 311(2) of UNCLOS ensures that the historical rights
regime remains intact. If there is a conflict, as a reverse induction of
the same article, the EEZ and Continental Shelf systems prevail over
individual State’s continental shelf claims’.
In order to determine whether such a conflict exists, a deep
probe is required on whether the sovereign rights over the natural
resources in the EEZ or Continental Shelf is exclusive to the rights of
other states. One can argue that since Article 56 of UNCLOS ensures
that States enjoy sovereign rights over the totality of “resources”
within the EEZ, and, since Article 62 allows the coastal State to
determine its capacity to “harvest the living resources of the exclusive
economic zone,”65 and only allows other States to intervene when the
coastal State “when the Coastal state does not have the capacity to
harvest the entire allowable catch,” the EEZ regime envisions a total
replacement of the pre-UNCLOS historical rights to that of the rights
stipulated to in the EEZ regime. The same line of reasoning can be
applied to the relationship between historical rights claims and the
continental shelf regime because Article 77 of UNCLOS guarantees
coastal states sovereign rights over the entirety of resources within its
continental shelf, without the same type of limitations stipulated to in
Article 62 in case of the EEZ. This is the exact line of reasoning
adopted in the Philippines v. China case, where the Arbitral Tribunal
65 “The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living
resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have
the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or
other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations
referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable
catch, having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in
relation to the developing States mentioned therein.” Article 62(2), LOSC.
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concluded that even if China’s historical rights claims over the
resources within the nine-dash line are valid, any historical rights held
by China are overridden by the EEZ and continental shelf regimes
envisioned by UNCLOS.66
This argument suffers from two weaknesses. First, even
though the sovereign rights envisioned in the EEZ and continental
shelf regimes are deemed to be exclusive, there is nothing that stops
the coastal state from entering into agreements that allow non-coastal
state parties to harvest some of the non-living or living resources
within the EEZ.67 This is addressed in Article 62, where the coastal
State can determine its own capacity to harvest the living resources
within its EEZ, and allocate the leftover resources to other States.
Article 62 essentially means that the coastal state enjoys wide discretion
in the distribution of its resources to other States. If new distribution
agreements are allowed under UNCLOS, maintaining old
arrangements that are solidified under customary international law is
permissible as well. Even though the provisions on the continental
shelf lack distributive arrangements like those envisioned in Article 62,
there is nothing in those provisions that blocks such arrangements
from remaining intact under UNCLOS.68
Secondly, in EEZ cases, UNCLOS envisions a regime of
functional distribution of resources, signified by Article 62. In giving
access to the EEZ, Article 62(3) stipulates that “the coastal State shall
take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, … the need
to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have
habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in
research and identification of stocks.” This means that the historical
rights of States must to be taken into account when allocating any
living stock within the EEZ. Thus, the legal significance of historical
rights held by a State remains a relevant consideration.
The Tribunal left open the possibility of the EEZ regime being
amended or modified by customary international law after the
conclusion of UNCLOS, adding, “such a claim would require the same

66
67
68

Supra note 6, para. 262.
Supra note 63, at 18.
Supra note 63, at 18.
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elements discussed above with respect to historic rights.”69 This also
leaves open the possibility that the regime could be modified by way of
treaty, provided that the treaty satisfies the conditions aligned in Article
41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.70
C. An analysis of the Chinese claims
As in the analysis of whether China’s claims are acceptable
under the jurisprudence of historic waters, two determinative issues
arise in establishing whether China has historical rights over the waters
resources within the nine-dash line: (i) whether China’s historical
rights’ were part of customary international law due to explicit
acceptance or acquiescence by other States, and (ii) whether China’s
historical rights, even if accepted under customary international law,
are not overridden by the EEZ and Continental Shelf regimes
envisioned by UNCLOS.
As to the first question, the criteria required to establish
acquiescence in historic waters claims also applies to China’s claims’
for historical rights. As noted above,71 China’s historic waters Claims
lack the requisite level of clarity, notoriety, and longevity to be
accepted by other states adopting the theory of acquiescence. As it
follows, the criteria for acquiescence will not be met for historical
rights as well. In the Philippines v. China case mentioned above, the
Arbitral Tribunal stated that China’s historical rights claims lack
sufficient historical grounds to be justified under international law.72
The Tribunal ruled that the little evidence that exists can be evidence

Supra note 6, para. 275.
Article 41(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads:
Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to
modify the treaty as between themselves alone if: (a) the possibility of such a
modification is provided for by the treaty; or (b) the modification in question is not
prohibited by the treaty and; (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties
of their rights under the treaty and performance of their obligations; (ii) does not
relate to a provision, derogation from which it is compatible with the effective
execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.
71 See page 17.
72 Supra note 6, para. 275.
69
70
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of sovereignty over the islands within the nine-dash line, but not
evidence of historical rights.73
Up to this point, the Tribunal’s reasoning is acceptable.
However, the Tribunal made an error by oversimplifying the situation
when it declared that any historical rights China potentially had prior to
UNCLOS are overridden by the EEZ and Continental Shelf regimes
of the 1982 convention. The Tribunal based its judgment on the
premise that UNCLOS establishes an exclusive sovereign rights regime
that is wholly incompatible with the regime riddled by historical
rights.74 However, as demonstrated above, the Tribunal’s reasoning
was flawed: historical rights that predate the adoption of UNCLOS
may still co-exist with the sovereign rights guaranteed under the EEZ
and continental shelf.75
The question remains of whether any historical rights held by
China over resources within the nine-dash line stay intact under
UNCLOS. To answer this question, one must look to the intent of the
Chinese and Philippine delegations, the point at which the two parties
acceded to the UNCLOS regime. Negotiation records show that
China’s delegates, unlike delegates from Australia and New Zealand,
argued for a strong EEZ with little possibility of preservation of
historical rights.76 This was one of the decisive points that led the
Id. at para. 267-271.
Id. at para. 278.
75 See page 23.
76 Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 24th Meeting, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.24 at para. 2 (Aug. 1, 1974), Official Records of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume II, 187 (Summary Records of
Meetings of the First, Second and Third Committees, Second Session); see also Summary Records
of Meetings of the Second Committee, 26th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.26
at para. 108 (Aug. 5, 1974), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, Volume II, 120 (Summary Records of Meetings of the First, Second and Third
Committees, Second Session); Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 30th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.30 at para. 22 (Aug. 7, 1974), Official
Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume II, 228
(Summary Records of Meetings of the First, Second and Third Committees, Second Session);
Summary Records of the Meetings of the Second Committee, 48th Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.48 at para. 29 (May 2, 1975), Official Records of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume IV, 77 (Summary Records, Plenary,
General Committee, First, Second and Third Committees, as well as Documents of the
Conference, Third Session).
73
74
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tribunal to deny China the opportunity to invoke historical rights.
According to the tribunal, China “was resolutely opposed to any
suggestion that coastal States could be obliged to share the resources
of the exclusive economic zone with other powers that had historically
fished in those waters.”
IV. AFFECT OF THE RULING BY PERMANENT COURT OF
ARBITRATION ON THE DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME
AREAS IN THE SCS
A. The Insular Features of the SCS
The SCS is a semi-enclosed or enclosed sea surrounded by
Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines.77 The
SCS measures about 550 to 650 nautical miles east-to-west and more
than 1200 nautical miles north-to-south.78 There are five groups of
insular features located in the SCS, which are disputed by the riparian
States regarding the ownership, status and the maritime entitlements of
such features: the Spratly Islands, the Paracel islands, Scarborough
Reef, the Pratas Islands and Macclesfield Bank.79
The Spratly Islands are located in the southern quadrant of the
SCS, and consist of 140 islets, rocks, reefs, shoals and sandbanks; all of
which are currently claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.80 The largest of the Spratly Islands is
Itu Aba, is a mere 0.56 km2 in size.

Due to the disputed status of Taiwan, it has been excluded from all of
the procedures relating to the South China Sea. Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, Semi-enclosed
Troubled Waters: A New Thinking on the Application of the 1982 UNCLOS Article 123 to
the South China Sea, 41 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 281, 301 (2010) (Taiwan is the only
riparian state bordering the SCS that is not a party to UNCLOS).
78 Robert Beckman, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea, 107 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 142, 143 (2013).
79 South
China
Sea,
LOWY
INSTITUTE,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/south-china-sea (last accessed Mar. 6, 2017)
80 Supra note 78, at 143.
77
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The Paracels, which are under Chinese control, are located in
the northwestern quadrant of the SCS and consist of 35 islets, shoals,
sandbanks and reefs. Woody Island is the largest of the Paracel Islands
and has an area of 2.1 km2.81
The Scarborough Shoal, another feature of the SCS, is a “large
atoll with a lagoon of about 150 km2 surrounded by reef” and located
124 nautical miles from the Philippines. It is claimed by China, Taiwan
and the Philippines.82 The Pratas Islands are located in the northern
quadrant of the SCS and currently occupied by Taiwan. The
Macclesfield Bank, in the middle of the SCS, is “a large atoll that is
totally submerged at low tide,” and claimed by both Taiwan and
China.83
B. Status of the Islands, Rocks and Low Tide Elevations under
UNCLOS
According to Article 121(1) of UNCLOS, “an island is a
naturally formed area of land, surounded by water, which is above
water at high tide.”84 Because of the word naturally, “artificially wrought
changes in its elevation will not entitle a rock of naturally lower
elevation to serve as a base point to generate various maritime zones
(unless it qualifies, in its natural state, as a low-tide elevation, in which
case it may have a limited effect on the baseline).”85 China has been
piling sand onto reefs and low-tide elevations located within the
Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal. In addition, China has
constructed military bases, airstrips, ports and radar facilities on those
features.86 Since these changes to the reefs are artificial and man-made,

Id. at 144.
Id. at 145.
83 Id.
84 Art. 121(1), UNCLOS.
85 Jonathan I. Charney, Rocks that cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 AM.
J. OF INT’L L. 863, 867 (1999).
86 For an interactive feature that show construction activities by China in
the SCS, see Derek Watkins, What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Feb.
29,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-hasbeen-building-in-the-south-china-sea-2016.html?ref=asia&_r=0
81
82
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they will not change their legal status to “islands” or “rocks” as defined
under UNCLOS.
Like land territory of a State, an island has the capacity to
produce its own maritime zones: the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf.87
An island is distinguished from a low-tide elevation based on
how water covers the land. A low-tide elevation is under water at a
high-tide but above water at low tide. An island is never submerged
under water during a low or high tide. A low-tide elevation is not
entitled to any maritime zones. Nevertheless, a low-tide elevation can
be used as a baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea if
it is situated within the territorial sea of the mainland or an island.88 A
low-tide elevation may not be appropriated because they are part of the
territorial sea or the continental shelf of a State.
UNCLOS states that “rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own” do not produce any
economic zone or continental shelf.89 On the other hand, they have the
capacity to produce a territorial sea and a contiguous zone. It can be
understood that an island is capable of sustaining human habitation or
economic life of its own.90 A rock does not need to satisfy both
requirements of “human habitation” and of “economic life of its own”
to be called an island because the Article 121(3) uses the word “or”
instead of “and” between these two requirements.91 While some
commentators have argued that the key factors in determining whether
a rock constitutes status as an island are “if it can provide fresh water,
food, and shelter to human inhabitants and if the island possesses
sufficient resources of its own to sustain economic life.”92 Additionally,
Van Dyke and Brook look to “whether the island can in fact support a
stable population” as a key factor, further stating that, “islands should
Art. 121(2), UNCLOS.
Art. 13, UNCLOS.
89 Art. 121(3), UNCLOS.
90 CRAIG H. ALLEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 70
(6th ed., New York: Naval Institute Press, 2014).
91 Marius Gjetnes, The Spratlys: Are They Rocks or Islands?, 32 OCEAN DEV.
& INT’L L. 191, 199 (2001); Charney, supra note 85, at 868.
92 Id. at 199
87
88
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generate ocean space if stable communities of people live on the island
and use the surrounding ocean areas.”93
Charney opposes those standards on the ground that nothing
in the travaux preparatoires mentions such an interpretation.94 Moreover,
Charney infers from the travaux preparatoires of UNCLOS that “human
habitation does not require that people reside permanently on the
feature or that the economic life be capable of sustaining a human
being throughout the year.”95 He further stated that economic activity
of a rock may be met by the exploitation of the living and non-living
resources found in its territorial sea.96
The case between the Philippines and China decided by the
Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to UNCLOS is the first
decision by an international tribunal to elaborate on Article 121(3) of
UNCLOS.97 Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the use
of the term “rock” in Article 121(3) does not require a feature be
composed of rock in the geologic sense.98 The Tribunal also tried to
explain the intent behind the use of the word “cannot” in Article
121(3) of UNCLOS as following:
The use of the word “cannot” in Article 121(3)
indicates a concept of capacity…it (the enquiry) is
concerned with whether, objectively, the feature is apt,
able to, or lends itself to human habitation or
economic life. That is the fact that a feature is currently
not inhabited does not prove that it uninhabitable. The

Jon M. Van Dyke and Robert A. Brooks, Uninhabited Islands: Their
Impact on the Ownership of the Oceans’ Resources, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 165, 286
(1983).
94 See Charney, supra note 85, at 870.
95 Id. at 868.
96 Id. (“Consequently, a feature would not be subject to Article 121(3)
disabilities if it were found to have valuable hydrocarbons (or other characteristics
of value, e.g., newly harvestable fisheries in its territorial sea, or perhaps even a
location for a profitable gambling casino) whose exploitation could sustain an
economy sufficient to support that activity through the purchase of necessities
from external resources”).
97 South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 6.
98 Id. at paras. 480-482.
93
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fact that it has no economic life does not prove that it
cannot sustain an economic life.
Nevertheless, historical evidence of human habitation and
economic life in the past may be relevant for establishing a feature’s
capacity. If a known feature proximate to a populated land mass was
never inhabited and never sustained an economic life, this may be
consistent with an explanation that it is uninhabitable. Conversely,
positive evidence that humans historically lived on a feature or that the
feature was the site of economic activity could constitute relevant
residence of a feature’s capacity.99
Regarding the “human habitation” requirement, the Tribunal
said that “at a minimum, sustained human habitation would require
that a feature be able to support, maintain and provide food, drink and
shelter to some humans to enable them to reside there permanently or
habitually over an extended period of time.”100 The term “habitation”
is said to imply “the habitation of the feature by a group or community
of persons.”101 The Arbitral Tribunal said that the military or
governmental personnel stationed on the Spratly Islands do “not
suffice to constitute ‘human habitation’ for the purposes of Article
121(3)” because “these groups are heavily dependent on outside
supply, and it is difficult to see how their presence on any of the SCS
features can fairly be said to be sustained by the feature itself, rather
than by a continuous lifeline of supply and communication from the
mainland.”102 The Tribunal pointed out that military or governmental
personnel are actually deployed “in an effort to support the various
claims to the sovereignty that have been advanced.”103
Like the scholars mentioned above, the Tribunal came to the
conclusion that an island would be given an EEZ and a continental
shelf if it is able sustain either human habitation or an economic life of
its own.104 However, the Tribunal indicated: “humans will rarely
inhabit areas where no economic activity or livelihood is possible. The
Id. at paras. 483-484.
Id. at para. 490.
101 Id. at para. 491.
102 Id. at para. 620; see also para. 550.
103 Id. at para. 620.
104 Id. at para. 496.
99

100
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two concepts are thus linked in practical terms, regardless of the
grammatical construction of Article 121(3).”105
Regarding the criteria of “economic life of its own,” the
Tribunal concluded that economic life must “pertain to the feature as
‘of its own’.”106 According to the Tribunal, an economic life of its own
does not cover activities from a possible EEZ or continental shelf,
although economic activities from the territorial sea may be part of the
economic life of a feature.107 It was pointed out in the award:
Distant fishermen exploiting the territorial sea
surrounding a small rock and making no use of feature
itself, however, would not suffice to give the feature an
economic life of its own. Nor would an enterprise
devoted to extracting the mineral resources of the
seabed adjacent to such a feature and making no use of
the feature itself.108
China has not released any information regarding the status of
insular features in the SCS. In the note verbale of 2011, China said its
Nansha (Spratly) Islands are “fully entitled to territorial sea, exclusive
economic zone (“EEZ”) and Continental Shelf” without
differentiating low tide elevations, rocks or islands from each other.109
Since these insular features include low-tide elevations, rocks and
islands, they cannot produce the same maritime zones. The Arbitral
Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration concluded that the high
tide elevations in the Spratlys were not capable of sustaining human
habitation or economic life of their own, therefore they were rocks.110
Indeed, most of the features in the SCS are low-tide elevations.
For example, all the formations in the Macclesfield Bank are
permanently submerged.111 Hence they may not be entitled to any
Id. at para. 497.
Id. at para. 543
107 Id. at paras. 502-03.
108 Id. at para. 503.
109 For the note verbal of 2011, see supra note 4.
110 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 622.
111 “The submerged bank at its shallowest is covered by some 30 feet of
water. Of course China may claim it as part of its extended continental shelf but it
has not yet done so.” Mark J. Valencia, China’s Maritime Machinations: The Good, the
105
106
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maritime zones. The Arbitral Tribunal in the SCS Arbitration, said that
Hughes Reef, the Gaven Reef (South), the Subi Reef, the Mischief
Reef and the Second Thomas Shoal were low-tide elevations.112 With
regard to the Scarborough Shoal, the Tribunal concluded that it was a
rock which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its
own and went to say:
The protrusions above high tide at Scarborough Shoal
are minuscule… They obviously could not sustain
human habitation in their naturally formed state; they
have no fresh water, vegetation, or living space and are
remote from any feature possessing such features.
Scarborough Shoal has traditionally been used as a
fishing ground by fishermen from different States, but
the Tribunal recalls that economic activity in the
surrounding waters must have some tangible link to
the high tide feature itself before it could begin to
constitute the economic life of the feature. There is no
evidence that the fishermen working on the reef make
use of, or have any connection to, the high tide rocks
at Scarborough Shoal. Nor is there any evidence of
economic activity beyond fishing. There is, accordingly,
no evidence that Scarborough Shoal could
independently sustain economic life of its own.113
Similarly, the Tribunal reached the same conclusion regarding
the Curteron reef, the Fiery Cross Reef, the Johnson Reef, the
McKennan Reef, the Gaven Reef (north). It concluded that they were
rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own.114 Therefore, they are not be entitled to any EEZ or continental
shelf.

Bad and the Ugly, THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 10, 2014), available at
http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/chinas-maritime-machinations-the-good-thebad-and-the-ugly/.
112 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, paras. 358, 366, 373, 378,
380.
113 Id. at para. 556.
114 Id. at paras. 557-570.

456

2017

Korkut & Kang

5:2

The Chinese position on Japanese claims over the
Okinotorishima is worth mentioning here. Japan claims an EEZ and
continental shelf around the Okinotorishima Atoll.115 Its area at high
tide is the “size of a twin bed and of a small bedroom.”116 Since 2004,
China has opposed Japanese claims concerning the legal status of the
Okinotorishima on the grounds that it is a rock, which “on its natural
conditions” cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its
own, and therefore cannot be entitled an EEZ or continental shelf.117
Most features in the SCS do not allow “on its natural conditions” the
sustaining of human habitation, nor do they allow economic activity of
their own. This situation highlights China’s inconsistent position taken
with respect to its interpretation of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. Smith
said: “Yet, if China claims all the islands in the Spratly group with a
view to claiming EEZs and continental shelves from them, then there
must be some inconsistency in its position on Article 121, paragraph
3.”118
C. Practice of States Regarding the Status of Insular Features and
Effects of the SCS Arbitration over the Practice of States
The Arbitral Tribunal stated, “there is no agreement based
upon State practice on the interpretation of the Tribunal of Article
121(3) which differs from the interpretation of the Tribunal as outlined
See Yann-huei Song, Okinotorishima: A “Rock or an “Island”? Recent
Maritime Boundary Controversy between Japan and Taiwan/China, in MARITIME
BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 14576 (eds. Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon M. Van Dyke, 2009) (the writer said the island
was unsuitable for human habitation and was not able to support economic activity
of its own); see also Robert W. Smith, Maritime Delimitation in the South China Sea:
Potentiality and Challenges, 41 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 214, 223 (2010).
116 Herber Smith, A Rock or an Island? The significance of Okinotorishima and
its Status under the International Law of the Sea, PUB. INT’L L. E-BULLETIN, available at
http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com//media/HS/HKTSIBEBASHL0407122110.pdf (last accessed May 2, 2016)
117 See China’s Note Verbale to the U.N. Secretary General,
CML/2/2009
of
Feb.
6,
2009,
available
at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.
pdf; Note Verbale CML/59/2011 of Aug. 3, 2011, available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_3aug11_e.
pdf
118 Robert W. Smith, supra note 115.
115
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in the previous sections.”119 Several countries have claimed fully
fledged EEZs around high tide elevations, which are actually
incompatible with the SCS Arbitration award. Mark E. Rosen, in an
article published in the Diplomat, gave examples of such proclamations
established by the United States and France.120 The United States
claims an EEZ of 407,635 sq km around the Johnson Atoll, which is
an uninhabited atoll and located 860 miles south of Hawaii. 121
Accordingly, this feature has never had any indigenous populations
and has no fresh water and tillable soil.122 Similarly Howland and Baker
Islands, located in the equatorial Pacific, have no fresh water or arable
land. However, they do have phosphorite and guano deposits, and they
have an EEZ of 434,921 sq km.123 Jarvin Island, another uninhabited
American island located in the South Pacific, has scant vegetation but
no fresh water, it is alleged that the island has never supported “a selfsustaining population.”124 Yet, it produces an EEZ of 316,665 sq
km.125
Similarly, France has some tiny, uninhabited features, yet they
generate fully entitled EEZs. Although the Austral Islands in French
Polynesia are uninhabited, they were given effect in the EEZ
generation.126 Rosen argued that these features nearly gave rise to an
increase of 4.7 sq km in the EEZ generation.127 The French Clipperton
Island, located 671 miles southwest of Mexico, is a ring-shaped atoll,
which has no freshwater nor arable land, yet it has an EEZ of 431,263
South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 553.
Mark E. Rosen, China Has Much to Gain From the South China Sea Ruling,
THE DIPLOMAT (July 18, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/china-hasmuch-to-gain-from-the-south-china-sea-ruling/; Peter Coy, Is it an Island or a Rock?
Ruling Could Cost U.S. a Huge Swath of Ocean?, BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-07-28/u-s-japan-and-othernations-could-lose-exclusive-economic-zones.
121 Id., Rosen.
122 Id.
123 The US District Court for the District of Guam in 2008 said that an
insular feature does not have to satisfy both the requirement of “human habitation”
and “economic life” to be called an island and ruled that Howland and Baker were
islands in terms of Article 121(1) of the LOSC. United States v. Marshalls 201, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38627 (D. Guam May 8, 2008).
124 Rosen, supra note 120.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
119
120
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sq km.128 Similarly the French Crozet Islands, uninhabited tiny features
between Africa and Antarctica, does not have any arable land or fresh
water; their EEZs amount to 574,558 sq km.129
Japan claims a 200 nautical miles EEZ zone around tiny
Okinotorishima and the Senkakus features. As mentioned above, the
Okinotorishima Island is uninhabited and does not have economic
activity of its own. Japan has an EEZ of over 400,000 sq km around
this feature.130 Senkakus are also uninhabited islets that have no fresh
water nor tillable soil.131
Most of the features above do not sustain human habitation in
their natural conditions. Although some have economic resources like
seabed mining and fishing, the Arbitral Tribunal in the SCS arbitration
stated that ”economic activity in the surrounding waters must have
some tangible link to the high-tide feature itself before it could begin
to constitute the economic life of the feature.”132 People who make use
of these resources actually have no connection to those features. The
Arbitral Tribunal also stated: “Purely economic activities, which accrue
no benefit for the feature or its population, would not amount to an
economic life of the feature as ‘of its own.’”133 Therefore, those insular
features do not sustain economic activity of their own. Following the
Arbitral Tribunal decision, it is likely that most of the aforementioned
States will receive objections from the international community
regarding their EEZs around these insular features. However, one
writer said that “it seems higly likely that these states will revise their
legal position in light of the tribunal’s award in the South China Sea
Arbitration and treat these ‘islands’ in future as mere ‘rocks’ without an
EEZ and continental shelf.”134

Id.
Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 6, para. 556
133 Id. at para. 500.
134 Stefan Talmon, The South China Sea Arbitration and the Finality of ‘Final’
Awards, 8 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 388, 400 (2017).
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Even if we assume the features in the SCS are regular islands
under Article 121(1) of UNCLOS, maritime delimitations are required
with States whose coasts are opposite or adjacent.
D. Maritime Delimitations Involving Islands
UNCLOS has parallel provisions regarding the delimitation of
the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
According to UNCLOS, “the delimitation of the continental shelf (and
the EEZ) between States with opposite or adjacent coast shall be
effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in
order to achieve an equitable result.”135 Unlike the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf, which applies the median line method,
UNCLOS does not regulate a standard delimitation method but
requires States to come to an equitable result.136
According to UNCLOS, the outer border of the EEZ and the
continental shelf may extend up to 200 nm from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.137 A State’s
Art. 74 and 83, UNCLOS.
Art. 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf provides:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more
States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf
appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the
absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent
States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application
of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which are drawn
in accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should
be defined with reference to charts and geographical features as they exist at a
particular date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent identifiable
points on the land.
137 Art. 57 and 76(1), UNCLOS.
135
136
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continental shelf may be wider than 200 miles if its continental margin
extends beyond 200 nm, although such extension may not be longer
than 350 nm from the baselines or longer than 100 nm from the 2,500meter isobaths.138 States that claim an extended continental shelf shall
submit relevant information and data to the CLCS.139
Article 2 of China’s “Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone
and the Continental Shelf” establishes a 200 nm limit of continental
shelf and EEZ from the baselines.140 The dash lines lay much closer to
the coasts of other coastal States than to China’s coastal line. For
example, in the Filippino situation, the nine-dash line is 50 nm from
the island of Luzon and 30 nm away from the island of Palawan.141 At
its farthest point, the nine-dash line is 800 nm away from the Chinese
mainland.142 Therefore, China’s claims extend beyond the entitlement
under UNCLOS. The ICJ said: “no maritime delimitation between
States with opposite and adjacent coasts may be affected unilaterally by
one of those States.”143 As Tanaka put it: “maritime delimitation is
international by nature.”144
Regardless of the issue surrounding whether insular features
are islands or rocks, international tribunals gave less or even no effect
to islands in maritime delimitations, on the ground that the situation of
the islands has disproportionally affected maritime delimitations
disproportionally. In general, international tribunals have avoided
addressing the issue of whether an insular feature is an island or a rock.

Art. 76(6), UNCLOS.
See supra note 2.
140 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, supra note 9, at 105 (citing to the “Law
on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of China” of June 26, 1998).
141 Emma Kingdon, A Case for Arbitration: The Philippines’ Solution for the
South China Sea, 38 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 157 (2015) (citing Audio tape:
A Discussion on the Philippines’ South China Sea Arbitration Case, held by the
Center for Strategic & International Studies (Dec. 3, 2013), available at
https://csis.org/multimedia/audio-discussion-philippines-south-china-seaarbitration- case, archived at http://perma.cc/5XE7-SY35).
142 Id.
143 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgment,
1984 I.C.J. Reports 299, para. 112.
144 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 197
(2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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The following are some of the decisions reached by the ICJ and
arbitral tribunals regarding maritime delimitation involving an island.
The Arbitral Tribunal in the Anglo-French maritime
delimitation case applied a median line between the French and British
mainland without taking into consideration the British Channel islands
located in front of the French mainland and giving a 12 nm continental
shelf area to the Channel Islands.145
In the Tunisia-Libya maritime delimination case,146 the
Kerkennah Islands were given half effect, as was the Seal Island in the
Gulf of Maine Case.147 In the 1985 Libya-Malta maritime delimination
case, the court stated that dependent islands would be given less effect
than independent island States in maritime delimitation.148
In the 1992 Canada-France maritime delimitation case, the
Arbitral Tribunal observed that with respect to “western seaward
projection (of the French islands located in front of the Canadian
mainland), it is unavoidable that any seaward extension of the French
coasts beyond their territorial sea would cause some degree of
encroachment and cut off the seaward projection towards the south
from points located in the southern shore of Newfoundland (the
Canadian coast).”149 The French islands St. Pierre and Miquelon,
located in front of the Canadian mainland, were given a 24 nm
maritime area and a narrow 200 nm EEZ towards the high seas.150

145 Case concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, 18 REP. OF INT’L
ARB. AWARDS 3,
para.
202
(June
30,
1977), available
at
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XVIII/3-413.pdf.
146 Supra note 47, para. 129.
147 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, supra note
143, para. 222.
148 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Malta), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1985, para. 53 (June 3, 1985), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?sum=353&p1=3&p2=3&case=68&p3=5.
149 Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada
and France: Decision in Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas (St. Pierre and
Miquelon),
31
I.L.M.
1145,
para.
67
(Sept.
1992),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20693736.
150 Id.
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In the Romania-Ukraine maritime delimitation case, the
Ukrainian Serpents’ Island was only entitled to a 12 nm territorial sea
and in the maritime delimination, the court did not take into account
the Serpents.151 The status of Serpents as to whether it was a rock was
not addressed nor taken into consideration by the ICJ because the
Court said that any reliance on the Serpents would create a
disproportionate effect in the delimitation line.152
V. CONCLUSION
All the above-mentioned islands in the delimitation cases
satisfy the definition of an island under Article 121(1) of UNCLOS.
Even so, they were not given a fully-fledged EEZ or continental shelf;
in some cases, they were given no EEZ or continental shelf. Since
most insular features in the SCS are disputed as to their island status,
and since most of them are barely above water at high tide, they should
not be taken into consideration in the maritime delimitation. Giving
full effect to these features would affect the maritime delimitations
disproportionally in the SCS. After the South China Sea Arbitration, in
which the Tribunal decided that most of the insular features are not
islands for the purposes of Article 121(3), even the equidistant/median
line method may not be a defensible claim for China since most of the
features will barely produce a territorial sea. Because the Chinese ninedash line does not comply with UNCLOS, nor with prior and current
decisions by the international tribunals, it is invalid under international
law norms and should not be given any recognition or effect.

Serpents’ Island has a 0.17 km2 land area. Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, 61.
152 Id. at 110.
151
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